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Are You a Good Person, or Just Being Good?
Social Norms Moderate Consistency and Licensing Effects in Social Media

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Social Norms Moderate Consistency and Licensing Effects in Social Media

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ABSTRACT

Are You a Good Person, or Just Being Good?
Social Norms Moderate Consistency and Licensing Effects in Social Media

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When and why do consumers help more or less after engaging in a prosocial behavior? This question has been an interesting topic of research especially in this time when social media has an influential effect on an individual's ethical decision making. However, little effort has been made to understand and reconcile this conflicting behavior. Based on two philosophical approaches to ethics (normative and behavioral), this research identifies that consumers act prosocially not only because they are a good person, but they want to be viewed as a good person by others. This research makes novel predictions that these two motives have differential effects on the pursuit of subsequent prosocial behavior, and the dominance of a particular motive is determined by the type of social norms that are used in an initial prosocial campaign. Across three studies, the present research demonstrates that consumers express more favorable reactions toward the subsequent prosocial campaign when their initial prosocial behavior is encouraged by a normative message highlighting what they ought to do – the consistency effect of injunctive norms. On the contrary, consumers show less favorable responses toward the subsequent prosocial campaign when their initial prosocial behavior is motivated by a

normative message that described how the majority of people behave in that situation – the licensing effect of descriptive norms. Two dimensions of moral identity (moral internalization and moral symbolization), which represent two motives for helping behavior, mediate the consistency effect of injunctive norms and the licensing effect of descriptive norms, respectively. This paper also proves how an additional moral message highlighting the internal aspects of helping behavior can mitigate the licensing effect of descriptive norms. Three causes that are important in society (helping underprivileged children, helping homeless people, and helping people with disabilities) and two different online platforms (Facebook and a website) are used to ensure the generalizability of the research. This paper is expected to spur future work clarifying divergent findings and examining consumers' sustainable prosocial behavior.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

- More than 750,000 nonprofits have used Facebook's fundraiser service to raise funds, and millions of dollars are going to charities through it (Facebook, 2018).
- 67% of nonprofits across the globe are set up to accept online donations, and 12.1% of all charitable donations ($31 billion) were made online in 2017 (The Non Profit Times, 2018).
- 55% of people who engage with nonprofits on social media end up taking some sort of action (e.g., volunteer, donate personal items, participate in charitable events in their community), and 58% of those people donate money (The Non Profit Times, 2018).

Social media marketing has become standard practice for those in the prosocial sector to expand their sphere of influence. Social media's interactive and decentralized environment enables requesters to engage strategically with new, larger, and younger audiences in a cost-effective manner. Social media's two-way communication between an organization and its network of constituents generates a greater degree of user involvement and interactivity (Lovejoy et al., 2012). Charitable organizations now actively incorporate digital into their overall business objectives in addition to conventional methods of a charitable campaign such as flyers, direct mail, door-to-door solicitation, and telemarketing campaigns. The adoption of social networks in nonprofits' campaigns is widely known as the key to campaign success in terms of promoting their causes and building a meaningful relationship with potential and current donors.

The growing use of social networking-based, charitable giving campaigns has also substantially changed consumers' decision-making processes, compared to those seen in traditional charitable contribution studies, in at least three ways. First, the dramatically increased number of charitable campaigns in social media allows consumers to be inevitably exposed to a variety of causes. Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, and Instagram spread the word about causes to current and potential supporters. As friends or family learn about the causes, they can share them with others. As a result, consumers are forced to view numerous causes every day. Secondly, aside from the frequency of requests, the time between requests also matters. In social media, one can be solicited by another cause right after the decision to give to the initial cause. This immediate request pushes consumers to decide whether to engage with a new cause or not in the course of a short time. Lastly, social media sites have launched new features such as one-click support that leads potential supporters to participate quickly and easily in campaigns more than ever. In light of the increased frequency of requests, the reduced time between requests, and the ease of responding to requests, a question that has been relatively neglected in the traditional prosocial research has received an increasing attention in charitable campaigns in social media: *how* does an individual's prosocial decision making for one charitable campaign affect her prosocial decision making for a subsequent campaign?

Two distinct and seemingly opposing streams of findings have been reported in the literature. On the one hand, there are studies demonstrating that after engaging in a prosocial behavior, individuals are more likely to act prosocially in a later campaign (Cornelissen et al., 2008). These studies postulate that individuals have a strong drive

toward *consistency* (Cialdini et al., 1991). On the other hand, there are studies insisting that after acting in a prosocial fashion, individuals are less likely to behave prosocially in response to a later opportunity (Monin and Miller, 2001). Usually termed *licensing* effects, these studies contend that because the initial prosocial behavior validates their moral identity, consumers subsequently permit or "license" themselves to engage in self-interested, immoral, or antisocial behavior (Monin and Miller, 2001). Despite the ongoing efforts of examining how consumers respond to a series of requests, the extant research is still confined to supporting either side of arguments. Little effort has been made to bridge these seemingly conflicting findings. It brings up another important question: *when* and *why* does people's initial prosocial behavior increase (i.e., consistency) or decrease (i.e., licensing) subsequent prosocial behavior?

To addresses the above questions, this research focuses on the nature of human beings who make a series of ethical decisions every day. There are two philosophical approaches that provide deep insights into how an ethical decision is made. According to *normative ethics*, people have moral virtues that are implanted by habits (Aristotle, 1934), and ethical behaviors are considered universal laws that can be generalized to all situations (Kant, 1785/1981). From this point of view, individuals engage in prosocial behaviors in a consistent manner because they are "good people." On the contrary, *behavioral ethics* insists that most people make decisions at the unconscious level, and those are subject to heuristics and biases (Drumwright et al., 2015; Kahneman, 2011). Because helping others is perceived to be a socially desirable behavior, people behave ethically to be favorably viewed by others. Once the initial ethical behavior fulfills

people's need for "being good," however, they can easily opt out of another helping behavior in the subsequent stage. Implications are in that the consistency and licensing effects can be better explained if the following question is fully discussed: are people good, or just being good?

In this research, a factor that distinguishes the consistency and licensing effects is investigated. Specifically, across three studies, this paper demonstrates that the increase and decrease in the likelihood of supporting a subsequent request are determined by whether consumers' decision for initial helping behavior is made under the consideration of being a good person or being viewed as a good person by others. The underlying mechanisms are explored, and the boundary condition of the licensing effect is suggested. In Chapter 2, the theoretical underpinning upon which this research is based will be reviewed, and the hypotheses will be described and justified. Chapter 3 will layout the methods and present the findings of three experimental studies, and a brief discussion of each study will be provided. Chapter 4 will incorporate the findings again in the light of theoretical frameworks this research proposes. Theoretical and practical implications will be provided, and limitations and ideas for future research will be suggested.

CHAPTER 2. THEOREITCAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

This research draws its theoretical underpinnings from two approaches to how people make an ethical decision (normative ethics and behavioral ethics). Two conflicting findings about how consumers' initial helping behavior impacts their subsequent helping behavior (consistency and licensing effects) are then reviewed. The type of social norms (injunctive norms and descriptive norms) are introduced as a concept that reconcile the conflicting findings. To shed light on the underlying mechanisms, two dimensions of moral identity (moral internalization and moral symbolization) are proposed and tested. A moral message intensifying the internal aspect of moral identity is suggested as a moderator that alleviates the licensing effect of descriptive norms.

Normative Ethics

Moral philosophy provides theoretical frameworks that enable scholars and marketers to analyze ethical issues in systematic, sophisticated, and nuanced ways (Drumwright and Murphy, 2014). As part of ethics, normative ethical inquiry seeks to develop judgements of right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice (Goodpaster, 1982). Although there are various approaches to normative ethics, two are well known in the field.

Aristotle (1934) draws on the concept of moral virtues and contends that virtuous people make the right decisions. From his point of view, moral virtues are not implanted in people by nature. Moral virtues are the result of habits instead (Aristotle, 1934;

Drumwright and Murphy, 2014). That is, just as people become builders by building houses, they become moral when they first put virtues into the action and practice them (e.g., “Do not lie or cheat” or “Help those in need”). The implication is that people should constantly engage in moral behavior because their characteristics are developed from those corresponding activities.

Similarly, Kant (1785/1981) asserts that people should act such that their actions could be universal laws for everyone else and in every situation. He argues that these universal principles impose categorical imperatives meaning that an action is represented as necessary of itself without reference to another end. A categorical imperative is unconditional so one’s moral decision is not preceded by any condition such as “if I can have a good reputation.” As such, the categorical imperative poses the question, “Can this behavior be universalized?” Moral laws take the forms of categorical imperatives, and these presuppose the absolute worth of all rational beings as ends in themselves. Kant contends that this duty-based or rule-based approach (e.g., “An individual has a rule to help people in need”) guides people’s moral behaviors in all situations.

Both Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Kant’s categorical imperative present plausible explanations about why people sustainably engage in prosocial behavior, but these approaches may not explain moral actions in all situations. For instance, although people say they care about moral issues, their good intentions do not easily translate into their actual behavior (Atkinson, 2013; Atkinson and Kim, 2015; Auger and Devinney, 2007; Carrigan et al., 2010; d’Astous and Legendre, 2009). People even use their history of moral behavior to justify their incongruent and discriminatory behavior (e.g., Monin and

Miller, 2001). These behaviors are not consistent with Aristotle and Kant's approaches to the normative ethics which assume that people are rational, capable of knowing what is right and capable of willing to do it (Kant, 1785/1981). Why do people sometimes act in an inconsistent fashion? This question is discussed in the following section.

Behavioral Ethics

Kahneman (2011) postulates that people easily violate the principle of maximizing expected utility, and most decision making is done intuitively by the unconscious system. In the field of ethics, a sizable amount of research has also documented that, in many situations, consumers' ethical decisions are subject to heuristics and biases (e.g., Drumwright et al., 2015; Drumwright and Kamal, 2015; Prentice, 2004). Called behavioral ethics, this research focuses upon how and why good people, or people who do not intend to do anything wrong, make unethical decisions. Factors that undermine people's ethical decision making have been identified and are largely categorized into three areas: cognitive errors, social and organizational pressures, and situational factors (Drumwright et al., 2015; Prentice, 2004).

Cognitive errors involve a heuristic and biased process in ways that consumers often do not understand or even notice in their unethical decision-making. The most noteworthy example is moral balancing (Merrit et al., 2010). People have a moral bank account in their minds and sustainably engage in morally desirable and undesirable behavior to bring back into equilibrium (Miller and Effron, 2010). Compensation and licensing are both instances of balancing. When people do something bad, they then

actively seek an opportunity to do something good (moral compensation). When people do something good, they become comfortable in doing something bad (moral licensing). Consumers' prior moral behavior endows them with credits that balance out subsequent immoral behaviors. Compensation and licensing are distinguishable in that they are working in different directions and rely on qualitatively different psychological processes.

Whereas compensation is motivated to deploy effort to repair and compensate for their failure, licensing occurs when there is a conflict of motives in the target behavior (e.g., between self-interest and doing right things) (Mullern and Monin, 2016). The temptation to behave in a self-interesting manner (e.g., refuse to help) leads them to overestimate the morality they established through past moral behaviors (Effron, 2014) and change the meaning of their bad behavior as if those are not immoral and unethical at all (Monin and Miller, 2001). For the above reasons, many scholars have noted that licensing involves more complicated and biased processes than compensation (e.g., Effron and Monin, 2010, Merritt et al., 2010, Miller and Effron, 2010; Muller and Monin, 2016).

Social and organizational pressures are pertinent to consumers' poor ethical choices due to their vulnerabilities to social influence. One of the most common social and organizational pressures is the conformity bias. The conformity bias refers to the tendency people have to behave like those around them rather than using their own personal judgment (Moscovici and Faucheux, 1972). People seem to be more comfortable mimicking others, even regarding ethical issues, than acting on the basis of

their own judgment (Drumwright and Murphy, 2014). A certain behavior of the majority people is considered common sense, and observers are likely to follow suit. In a word, the conformity bias can cause people to follow the crowd and conform to the behavior of others without using their own independent ethical judgment.

As the last behavioral ethics area, situational factors include physical and environmental factors that affect (often adversely) ethical decision making (e.g., time pressure, transparency of actions, and cleanliness). Social media is an environmental factor that allows consumers to foster online discussions, make a connection with others, and create and share information in near-real time (Bortree and Seltzer, 2009; Lovejoy et al., 2012). This research is particularly interested in understanding how consumers' initial helping behavior influences their subsequent helping behavior. In the context of charitable giving, the characteristics of social media (i.e., higher frequency of requests, the reduced time between requests, and the easiness of support for requests) suggests that consumers become much more susceptible to cognitive errors and social and organizational pressures than the offline setting.

Based on these different approaches, the next section provides a detailed review of past research on how consumers' support for an initial request brings out divergent outcomes for a subsequent request.

Two Conflicting Views: Consistency vs. Licensing

Research on moral self-regulation has convincingly indicated that one's recent behavioral history is an important factor in shaping one's current moral behavior (e.g.,

Monin and Jordan, 2009; Zhong et al., 2009). However, two distinct and seemingly opposing streams of findings have been reported in the literature.

On the one hand, there are studies demonstrating that after engaging in prosocial behavior, consumers are more likely to act prosocially in a later campaign (Burger and Caldwell, 2003; Cornelissen et al., 2008; Freedman and Fraser, 1966). These studies postulate that consumers have a strong drive toward *consistency* (Cialdini et al., 1995; Festinger, 1957). Initial prosocial action may highlight one's self-concept as a moral individual and motivate one to act in line with this view of one's moral self. This approach is compatible with the idea of virtue ethics in that virtues are essentially good habits and are instilled in people by practice. Because ethical values are internalized as character traits, virtuous people are more likely to exhibit consistency (e.g., "You care about people in need because you are compassionate."). Kant (1785/1981)'s duty-based approach also accounts for people's consistent patterns of moral behavior. In the form of categorical imperatives, as mentioned early, he insists that moral behaviors are universal laws of nature and should be treated as an end rather than as a means. As a result, inciting people to help can cause them to help more at a later stage (e.g., "I always contribute to worthy causes"). Many charitable organizations and advocacy groups in social media adopt one or two steps of participation to gain initial support from consumers. Their assumption appears to be if individuals first agree to a smaller request, they are more likely to comply with a larger request thereafter.

On the other hand, there are studies demonstrating that after acting in a prosocial fashion, individuals are less likely to behave prosocially in response to a later opportunity

(Jordan et al., 2011; Merrit et al., 2010; Monin and Miller, 2001; Nisan, 1991). Usually termed *licensing effects*, these studies contend that the initial prosocial behavior validates their moral identity or provides moral credits (as in a moral bank account). People are then able to engage in self-interested, immoral, or antisocial behavior without damaging their self-concept and self-presentation as a moral person. For instance, after disagreeing with racist statements (Monin and Miller, 2001) or expressing a preference to vote for Obama (Effron et al., 2009), consumers more comfortably express a preference for hiring a white person over a black person for a job. In the context of prosocial behavior, prior research has also shown that recalling past moral actions makes individuals express lower prosocial intentions (Jordan et al., 2011). Choosing green products in an online store allows consumers to cheat more on subsequent tasks (Mazar and Zhong, 2010). Behavioral ethics provides the theoretical undergirding for the licensing effects. According to this particular point of view, most ethical decisions are not made under the rational actor model (Drumwright et al., 2015). Heuristics and biases largely influence people's ethical decision making so they tend to gather, process, and even remember information in a self-serving way (e.g., Monin and Miller, 2001; Effron, 2014). Thus, in this research context, the licensing effects suggests that supporting an online charitable campaign would excuse people's subsequent self-interest behavior. It is likely to involve the exaggeration of moral credentials that they established through past behavior (Effron, 2014) and changes of the meaning of the subsequent immoral behavior as if it is not immoral at all (Monin and Miller, 2001). Consequently, the likelihood of supporting a subsequent charitable campaign would decrease.

The equivocal findings suggest a need for research aiming at understanding when and why consumer's initial act of helping behavior does (consistency) or does not (licensing) lead to meaningful contributions to subsequent causes. This paper identifies social norms a construct that might moderate the influence of initial prosocial behavior on subsequent actions in the context of a fundraising campaign in social media.

Moderating Role of Social Norms

TWO TYPES OF SOCIAL NORMS

Social norms are implicit social rules that regulate people's behavior within a community. According to Cialdini and his colleagues (1991), social norms are best divided into two categories: "*descriptive norms*," referring to what is commonly done by people in a given situation, and "*injunctive norms*," conveying information regarding what ought to be done (Cialdini et al., 1991). For instance, in the Facebook charitable campaign for reuniting immigrant parents with their children, helping behavior can be promoted as something other people are doing (e.g., "75% of Facebook users who visited this page supported the cause" – descriptive norm) or as something people should be doing (e.g., "We should stop family separation" – injunctive norm).

Though injunctive and descriptive norms independently and interdependently influence individuals' prosocial behaviors, these two are distinguishable in several ways. Injunctive norms focus on an "ought," or "standards" of behavior (Cialdini et al., 1991). This type of norm highlights what people feel is right based on their moral beliefs, which is a widely shared expectation in a social group about how people, in general, ought to act

in various circumstances. That is, injunctive norms would highlight superordinate and overarching values of behavior. In contrast, descriptive norms do not trigger the same value reflection. Descriptive norms focus more on the action of the group (Cialdini et al., 1991) than the moral rules of the society. This type of norm motivates both private and public actions by informing individuals of what is likely to be effective or adaptive behavior in that situation (Cialdini et al., 1991).

A body of research has interested in the relative effectiveness of two types of social norms and has consistently found descriptive norms to be a more persuasive framing for encouraging people's prosocial behavior than injunctive norms (Angstrom et al., 2016; Cialdini, 1991; Goldstein et al., 2008). The behavior of others shapes individuals' interpretations of and responses to a situation (Bearden and Etzel, 1982, Ryoo et al., 2017). Thus, the superiority of descriptive norms over injunctive norms becomes prevalent especially in novel, ambiguous, or uncertain situations (Griskevicius et al., 2006; Hochbaum, 1954; Park and Lessig, 1977; Shapiro and Neuberg, 2008).

Of particular interest in this research is whether the impact of social norms used in a charitable campaign persists over time in a different charitable campaign. In this regard, novel predictions were made such that individuals are more (less) likely to help in the subsequent campaign when their initial prosocial behavior is provoked by injunctive norms (descriptive norms). Injunctive norms reinforce virtue and duty-based ethics, leading to consistency, while descriptive norms tap into consumers' needs to be viewed favorably by others, so they become subject to heuristics and biases (e.g., conformity bias), which in turn leads to licensing. These arguments will be further elaborated in the

following section in which two dimensions of moral identity are introduced to explain why type of social norms can influence consistency and licensing effects.

TWO DIMENSIONS OF MORAL IDENTITY AS UNDERLYING MECHANISMS

According to Aquino and Reed (2002), moral identity has two dimensions: "*internalization,*" referring to the degree to which moral traits are central to the self, and "*symbolization,*" referring to the degree to which moral traits are reflected in the respondent's actions in the world. This two-dimensional concept of moral identity is consistent with the self as having both an internal and external aspect (Erikson, 1964; Fenigstein et a., 1975), and it appeared to best represent motives for helping behavior: as a good person and to be a good person. Prior research has demonstrated that individuals have various identities and an initial task can prime a certain self-concept that influences the pursuit of subsequent behavior (e.g., Kahn and Dahr, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2005). In other words, different type of moral identity would be dominantly activated by different types of social norms in an initial campaign and it subsequently influences consumers' decision making in response to a subsequent charitable campaign in social media.

Moral internalization as a mechanism of the consistency effect of injunctive norms

A person with higher moral internalization should have moral traits, goals, and behaviors central to the self (Aquino and Reed, 2002). If this type of moral identity becomes salient, individuals are more likely to engage consistently in moral actions, including charitable giving, because doing so enhances the consistency of their self-concept as a moral person (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984, Winterich et al., 2013). Otherwise, the inconsistencies between internally held attitudes and beliefs and behavior

would become unacceptable (Gibbons, 1990; Goukens, et al., 2009). Importantly, moral internalization has much in common with Aristotle and Kant's approaches to normative ethics in that self-consistency is the primary driver of charitable behavior (e.g., Aristotle, 1934; Drumwright and Murphy, 2014; Kant, 1785/1981; Winterich et al., 2013). The implication is that moral internalization can adequately capture one's helping behavior is guided by virtue and duty-based ethics.

As stated above, injunctive norms are found to have stable and cross-situational properties, be less prone to social influence, and emphasize superordinate and overarching values of behavior (Cialdini et al., 1991). This type of social norm is likely to not only elicit the moral character of the person (i.e., virtue ethics) but also enhance deontological (that is, duty-based) aspects of moral identity that are best judged as "good," standing alone and without regard to consequences or outcomes (Aristotle, 1934; Drumwright and Murphy, 2014; Kant, 1785/1981). Thus, it stands to reason that if consumers agree to act in a prosocial fashion with injunctive norms in the initial campaign, they would infer that their attitude and values must be in line with prosocial behavior (that is, the moral internalization becomes salient), leading consumers to act in the same fashion later (i.e., consistency effect).

H1a: When injunctive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable campaign, participants are more likely to support (e.g., willingness to support the campaign, engaging in electronic word-of-mouth, and actual donation) the subsequent charitable campaign.

H1b: The consistency effect of injunctive norms will be mediated by moral internalization.

Moral symbolization as a mechanism of the licensing effect of injunctive norms

As opposed to moral internalization, people with higher moral symbolization desire to express their moral characteristics to others through their actions in the world (Aquino and Reed, 2002). Because these people are eager to present themselves in a positive light to others, they are more sensitive to others' comments or actions (Winterich et al., 2013). In line with this, research on impression management has demonstrated that people strategically alter their behavior to present themselves positively and are no more likely to provide meaningful support to those in need if their past prosocial behavior satisfies these impression-management concerns (Ashworth et al., 2005; Kristofferson et al., 2014; Sengupta et al., 2005; White and Dahl, 2007). Similarly, research has shown that if prosocial behavior is guided by such external motives, individuals are less likely to engage in subsequent prosocial behaviors (e.g., Kristofferson et al., 2014; Leary and Kowalsky, 1990). That is, when moral symbolization becomes salient, moral licensing effects are more likely to occur. Moral symbolization could properly capture the extent to which consumers' helping behavior is influenced by others' observations and evaluations – a key component of behavioral ethics.

Descriptive norms are influential because this type of norm emphasizes specific and contextual details of how people around us behave based on more temporary properties (Cialdini et al., 1991, Ryoo et al., 2017). People are susceptible to how the crowd behaves and tend to conform their behavior to that of the majority of people (Moscovici

and Faucheux, 1972). Rather than focusing on their own personal moral value, descriptive norms make people more concerned about how much they fit in with others. Such social pressures would lead them to make ethical decisions in a biased manner (Drumwright et al., 2015). As discussed earlier, this biased process entails the overestimation of morality that people established through prior good deeds and enables them to freely do less desirable things when being asked for a subsequent request (i.e., moral licensing). Taken together, it is predicted that descriptive norms in the initial charitable campaign will activate consumers' moral symbolization to a greater extent and therefore decrease their support for the subsequent campaign.

H2a: When descriptive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable campaign, participants are less likely to support (e.g., willingness to support the campaign, engage in electronic word-of-mouth, and actual donation) the subsequent charitable campaign.

H2b: The licensing effect of descriptive norms will be mediated by moral symbolization.

THE ROLE OF A MORAL MESSAGE THAT BOLSTERS MORAL INTERNALIZATION

So far, it has been argued that an initial act of helping behavior for a cause can increase or decrease subsequent support for another cause depending on the type of social norm. One question that arises, then, is whether there exists a way to mitigate the licensing effect following initial giving behavior that is prompted by descriptive norms.

The mediating roles of two dimensions of moral identity suggest that the consistency effect of injunctive norms and the licensing effect of descriptive norms are possible via enhanced moral internalization and moral symbolization, respectively. Thus,

it stands to reason that the licensing effect of descriptive norms could be diminished when consumers have a chance to associate their initial helping behavior with internal aspects of moral identity.

In this regard, this research attempts to examine the effectiveness of additional moral message that moderates the mediating role of moral symbolization. A condition will be added in which participants who respond to the descriptive norm will receive a moral message before they make their decision on the subsequent request. The moral message (e.g., "You are a person who truly cares about people in need") represents virtue ethics as it has to do with the type of person one is–the virtues that she practices, which are part of her character (Aristotle, 1934). If the type of moral identity matters, the moral message that helps consumers attribute the meaning of their initial behavior to their central values and beliefs could mitigate the licensing effect even if consumers' initial helping behavior is guided by descriptive norms. Considering that injunctive norms highlight the internal aspects of moral identity, consumers who makes their initial decision of support with injunctive norms would not be affected by the display of the moral message. Thus, the following hypotheses are generated.

H3a: When moral message is not available, participants in the injunctive norms condition are more likely to support the subsequent campaign than those in the descriptive norms condition.

H3b: When moral message is available, the likelihood of supporting the subsequent campaign will be not different between two social norms conditions.

The moderating effect of moral message can be examined in a different way.

H4a: Participants in the descriptive norms condition are more likely to support the subsequent campaign when the moral message is available (vs. not available).

H4b: Participants in the injunctive norms condition will not be influenced by the presence of moral message.

Note that H4a and H4b are included in the hypotheses as the comparison between the conditions of moral message (available vs. not available) is an alternative way to capture the impact of moral message on each type of social norms.

Examining the role of moral message is important not only because it identifies the boundary condition of the licensing effect of descriptive norms, but it can tease apart the two different processes of consistency and licensing effects. Throughout the paper, it is argued and demonstrated that the increased level of moral symbolization contributed to the licensing effect of descriptive norms, and this effect can be alleviated if an additional moral message shifts participants' attention to the internal aspects of moral identity. Thus, the moral message is also expected to moderate the mediating role of moral symbolization. Given that a similar form of message will be presented, the mediating role of moral internalization would not be affected by the presence of moral message.

H5a: When moral message is available, moral symbolization will not mediate the licensing effect of descriptive norms.

H5b: Moral internalization will mediate the consistency effect of injunctive norms regardless of the presence of moral message.

The mediated moderation would provide additional evidence that whether consumers connect their initial behavior with their internal moral value is the key mechanism that yields consistency or licensing effects.

Please see Figure 1 illustrating the conceptual design of the current research. The hypotheses of the current research are also organized in Table 1 (next page).



Figure 1. Conceptual Design of the Current Research

Table 1. The Summary of Hypotheses

	Hypotheses
Study 1 & 2	**H1a**: When injunctive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable campaign, participants are more likely to support the subsequent charitable campaign.
Study 2	**H1b**: The consistency effect of injunctive norms will be mediated by moral internalization.
Study 1 & 2	**H2a**: When descriptive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable campaign, participants are less likely to support the subsequent charitable campaign.
Study 2	**H2b**: The licensing effect of descriptive norms will be mediated by moral symbolization.
Study 3	**H3a**: When moral message is not available, participants in the injunctive norms condition are more likely to support the subsequent campaign than those in the descriptive norms condition.
Study 3	**H3b:** When moral message is available, the likelihood of supporting the subsequent campaign will be not different between two social norms conditions.
Study 3	**H4a:** Participants in the descriptive norms condition are more likely to support the subsequent campaign when the moral message is available (vs. not available).
Study 3	**H4b:** Participants in the injunctive norms condition will not be influenced by the presence of moral message.
Study 3	**H5a:** When moral message is available, moral symbolization will not mediate the licensing effect of descriptive norms.
Study 3	**H5b:** Moral internalization will mediate the consistency effect of injunctive norms regardless of the presence of moral message.

CHAPTER 3. METHODS

To examine the proposed hypotheses, the present research conducted three experiments, which were organized as follows. In Study 1, the research offered initial evidence that the type of social norms is the determinant of consistency or licensing effects. In Study 2, the underlying mechanisms were explored by investigating whether two dimensions of moral identity mediate the social norm effect. Study 2 also attempted to capture participants' actual donation behavior. In Study 1 and 2, social norms were manipulated using Facebook's fundraisers while different causes were employed between two studies. Study 3 further extended the scope of this research by demonstrating that the presence of a moral message bolstering internal aspects of moral identity can mitigate the licensing effect of descriptive norms. A fictitious online charitable giving website was created, and social norms and the moral message were manipulated in the form of pop-up messages. Note that the procedure of the studies is illustrated in Figure 2 (next page) and the findings are summarized in Table 2 (p. 58).



Figure 2. Procedure of Studies

Study 1

Study 1 aimed to provide preliminary evidence that the type of social norms is a key factor that determines whether consumers' initial prosocial behavior facilitates or hinders their subsequent prosocial behavior in the context of charitable giving on Facebook.

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE

Participants

A total of 114 participants (M_{age} = 39.05, 68 Female) were recruited from Amazon's MTurk and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (injunctive norms, descriptive norms, or control condition). A baseline condition with a neutral initial behavior was included as it is important to distinguish whether licensing or compensation or both occurred (Mullen and Monin, 2016). Participants were paid 50 cents for their participation. The number of participants was calculated on the basis of the power analysis using the G*Power program. MTurk has been shown to be a valid and reliable source for online data collection (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Considering that this study aimed to better understand consumers' responses to a series of charitable giving campaigns in social media, using an online-panel particularly seemed proper in this research context.

Stimuli development

For the experiment, two main Facebook pages were created for two causes: "Helping underprivileged children" and "Helping homeless people." Facebook's fundraising page was selected as a social media platform with the following reasons.

Non-profits reported that Facebook is the most important social media for their causes and 42% of social marketers have claimed that Facebook is critical or important to their business (The Non Profit Times, 2018). As mentioned earlier, more than 750,000 nonprofits have used Facebook's fundraiser service, and millions of dollars are going to charities through it (Facebook, 2018). Thus, Facebook's fundraising page was considered an appropriate social networking platform in this research context. The issues of underprivileged children and homeless people were selected as the focus of this study because the two commonly addressed top four most discussed issues in the prosocial sector: public and societal benefit, human service, education, and health (The Non Profit Times, 2018). As shown in Appendix A, the layout of these two Facebook fundraisers remained the same, but they contained different written and graphical content to describe respective socially responsible issues.

In a pretest, participants (N = 60, M_{age} = 39.65 years, 23 Female, recruited from MTurk) were shown either of two causes and reported that the two did not significantly differ in terms of believability ($M_{children}$ = 5.57 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.43; $p > .1$), interest ($M_{children}$ = 5.13 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.03; $p > .1$), trustworthiness ($M_{children}$ = 5.17 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.37; $p > .1$), or writing quality ($M_{children}$ = 5.6 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.23; $p > .1$). Each was measured with a single item on a seven-point semantic scale (e.g., 1 = Unbelievable, 7 = Believable). The importance of the two causes was also measured using a 2-item scale for each campaign: (1) "To what extent do you think 'Helping homeless people (underprivileged children)' is an important issue in our society?" and (2) "To what extent do you think 'homeless (underprivileged children)' are people in need?" (r = .89) on a

seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = A great deal) and found no significant difference between the two causes ($M_{children}$ = 5.84 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 6.01; $p > .1$). The results of pretest ensured the appropriateness of the two topics of campaigns for a social norms intervention.

Because this research intended to examine how participants' initial prosocial decision-making influences their subsequent decision-making and how the type of social norms differentiates this effect, the manipulations of the type of social norms were made only for the initial campaign; no treatment was employed in the subsequent campaign. Specifically, for those in the injunctive norms condition, both the graphical content and descriptions of Facebook fundraising pages were read "It is our responsibility to help underprivileged children (homeless people)" whereas "…75% of people who visited this page help underprivileged children (homeless people)" was used for those in the descriptive norms condition (See Appendix B). The manipulations of these two types of social norms were in line with prior studies (Cialdini et al., 1991; Ryoo et al., 2017).

Another pretest (N = 122, M_{age} = 39.37 years, 54 Female, recruited from MTurk) was conducted to determine whether the manipulated social norms messages influenced the normative belief of the target audience. This pretest was conducted with a separate sample from that of the previous pretest as social norms may have a confounding effect on participants' responses to believability, interest, trustworthiness, and quality of content and the importance of issue. Participants were shown one of two Facebook pages which was manipulated either injunctive or descriptive norms and measured the perception of two social norms delineated in the Facebook page, using a 4-item scale (e.g., "The

information presented in the Facebook page indicated that most people who visited this campaign page helped underprivileged children (homeless people)" and "The information presented in the Facebook page indicated that helping underprivileged children (homeless people) is what we ought to do") on a seven-point Likert-type scale (e.g., 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). First (last) two items were averaged to create the index of descriptive (injunctive) norms (r = .93 and r = .96, respectively; explained variance = 80.8%). After then, participants responded to two questions regarding the normative belief, using a 2-item scale: "I think that most people who visited this campaign page helped underprivileged children (homeless people)," "I think helping underprivileged children (homeless people) is our responsibility." All questions were modified from a work by Lapinski et al. (2013) and were measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale (e.g., 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree).

The results of second pretest showed that participants perceived the Facebook page of descriptive norms to describe a high prevalence of helping behavior among people (Underprivileged children: $M_{\text{descriptive}}$ = 6.03 vs. $M_{\text{injunctive}}$ = 4.58; $p < .001$; Homeless people: $M_{\text{descriptive}}$ = 5.92 vs. $M_{\text{injunctive}}$ = 3.57; $p < .001$), whereas they perceived the Facebook page of injunctive norms to indicate helping behaviors are what we ought to do (Underprivileged children: $M_{\text{descriptive}}$ = 3.67 vs. $M_{\text{injunctive}}$ = 5.83; $p < .001$; Homeless people: $M_{\text{descriptive}}$ = 2.94 vs. $M_{\text{injunctive}}$ = 4.94; $p < .001$). Participants also thought that most people supported the campaign after viewing the Facebook page of descriptive norms (Underprivileged children: $M_{\text{descriptive}}$ = 5.97 vs. $M_{\text{injunctive}}$ = 4.13; $p < .001$; Homeless people: $M_{\text{descriptive}}$ = 5.63 vs. $M_{\text{injunctive}}$ = 3.97; $p < .01$), whereas they thought

helping others are our responsibility after seeing the Facebook page of injunctive norms (Underprivileged children: $M_{descriptive} = 3.53$ vs. $M_{injunctive} = 5.3$; $p < .001$; Homeless people: $M_{descriptive} = 2.97$ vs. $M_{injunctive} = 5.35$; $p < .001$). The results confirmed that two types of social norms were manipulated appropriately in Facebook pages, and participants' normative beliefs were distinctively influenced by the embedded moral message.

Procedure

Upon agreeing to participate in the experiment, participants of the main experiment read instructions saying that a recently formed charitable organization named "We Support" is requesting feedback regarding the effectiveness of their online communication tool—a fundraiser on Facebook. Participants were told that they will evaluate just one campaign in the study. They then viewed either type of social norms as an initial campaign without knowing another cause would follow.

It was critical that participants did not expect another request for a charitable donation. For the licensing effect to occur, there had to be a conflict of motives in response to the subsequent request for a donation (Mullen and Monin, 2012). Because the subsequent campaign was not expected, participants might want to do something personally beneficial (e.g., refuse to help), but they might be torn by a conflicting motive (e.g., doing the right thing). In this case, the fact that they had already engaged in helping behavior might license them to yield to temptation, which could lead to a decrease in support for the subsequent campaign. The assumption was that individuals pursue multiple, somethings conflicting goals (Kahn and Dahr, 2006; Wheeler et al., 2005). The

unexpected asking was also important for the consistency effect as it functioned to distinguish whether participants' persistent prosocial behavior was due to their dispositional characteristics (as a moral person) or the effect of social norms. The sudden asking would make participants more susceptible to normative information. As they would think more of what the prior helping behavior meant to be with the presence of injunctive norms, there would be no room for a conflicting motive. The prior behavior would bolster the notion of virtue ethics and they were therefore more likely to comply with the later campaign. Note that the presentation of the two causes in the initial and subsequent campaigns was counterbalanced to eliminate the order effect.

After viewing the initial campaign at a self-paced rate, participants in the injunctive and descriptive norms conditions were asked if they would be willing to donate their money to the campaign (i.e., Yes or No). To enhance their moral footprint, participants who agreed on donating their money were thanked for their donation before proceeding to the second session; those who expressed their disinterest in the initial campaign (i.e., answered 'No') were directed to the end page of the experiment. Participants in the control condition were neither shown any of social norm messages in the initial campaign nor received the donation question. Instead, they reported how believable, interesting, trustworthy, and well-written the initial campaign is. In other words, the first campaign they saw was neutral, and it did not make reference to a moral dimension.

Before being exposed to a second Facebook page for another charitable giving campaign, all participants were asked to complete an animal crossword puzzle as a filler

task (Carney and Levin, 2003; See Appendix C) which they spent about three minutes to complete. The animal crossword puzzle was a widely used filler task in psychology to disguise the true purpose of the study. Upon completion of the filler task, all participants were shown another campaign. Note again that participants did not expect the second campaign. Because the order of the two campaigns was counterbalanced, participants who had initially been presented with the campaign for helping underprivileged children (homeless people) subsequently viewed the campaign for helping homeless people (underprivileged children). The subsequent campaign did not contain any normative information. Exploration of the website was self-paced.

After viewing the second campaign, all participants answered questions concerning their willingness to support the campaign (WTS) with a 3-item scale (e.g., "How likely are you to support this cause?; $M = 4.23$, $SD = 1.78$, $\alpha = .93$; White and Peloza, 2009) and the willingness to engage in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) with a 4-item scale (e.g., "To what extent is it likely that you will say positive things about this cause on social sites such as Facebook?; $M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.89$, $\alpha = .96$; Eisingerich et al., 2015). All the above scales were measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale (e.g., 1 = Extremely unlikely, 7 = Extremely likely). See Appendix D for details of the items. WTS and eWOM were worth exploring as they properly captured participants' general and specific forms of helping behavior, respectively. The consistent patterns between the two dependent variables would ensure that the conceptual design of this research sufficiently addressed not only how participants reacted to the "given" requests but also how likely they were willing to be an "active messenger" in social media.

After completing WTS and eWOM for the subsequent campaign, participants in injunctive and descriptive norms conditions reported how believable (M = 5.26, SD = 1.62), interesting (M = 4.97, SD = 1.71), trustworthy (M = 4.92, SD = 1.74), and well-written (M = 5.23, SD = 1.54) the two campaigns were. The importance of the issues (M = 6.03, SD = 1.22, α = .89) was also measured, using the items used in the pretest. After then, participants indicated their perceptions of the moral message shown in the Facebook pages as the manipulation check, using a 4-item scale used in the pretest (Descriptive: M = 4.51, SD = 1.87, α = .9 and Injunctive: M = 4.5, SD = 1.69, α = .91; explained variance = 85.5%). People use normative information as a heuristic guide to behavior (Cialdini, 2007) and research on information processing suggested that the degree to which people process information is highly dependent on their involvement with the issue (e.g., Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo, 1979). To control the involvement with helping behavior, all participants reported their history of helping behavior by responding to the following questions: "How frequently do you typically help people in need?," "How often do you give to charitable organizations?," and "How often do you volunteer for charitable organizations?" (M = 4.44, SD = 1.51, α = .86) on a seven-point Likert-type scale (e.g., 1 = Very infrequently, 7 = Very frequently). At the end of the study, participants completed demographic measures and were thanked.

RESULTS

The results showed that the fundraising requests for the two causes (i.e., Helping underprivileged children and helping homeless people) were not significantly different in terms of believability (M_{children} = 5.33 vs. M_{homeless} = 5.18; $p > .1$), interest (M_{children} = 4.95

vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 4.99; p > .1), trustworthiness ($M_{children}$ = 4.94 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 4.9; p > .1), and writing quality ($M_{children}$ = 5.25 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.2; p > .1). The cause of underprivileged children (M = 6.02) was also not perceived to be socially more important than the cause of homeless people (M = 6.01, p > .1). The results of manipulation check for two types of social norms revealed that participants saw the Facebook page of descriptive norms was more likely to delineate what the majority of people have done (M = 5.89) rather than what ought to be done (M = 3.25, p < .001) whereas the Facebook page of injunctive norms was more likely to indicate what ought to be done (M = 5.9) rather than what the majority of people have done (M = 2.96, p < .001). Thus, the selection of causes and the manipulation of two types of social norms were appropriate and effective.

Concerning the initial campaign, 47.37% (38 out of 76) participants in both social norms conditions reported their intention to donate the money. The logistic regression analysis revealed that participants in the descriptive norms condition (60%, 24 out of 40) were more likely to donate money than those in the injunctive norms condition (38.89%, 14 out of 36) at a marginal level ($r\phi$ = .044, χ^2 = 3.404, p = .068).

A MANCOVA was performed to examine whether two types of social norms facilitated or hindered consumers' willingness to support the campaign (WTS) and their engagement in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) for a following cause, using the involvement with helping behavior as a covariate. As mentioned early, those who indicated their unwillingness to donate money for the initial cause were excluded from the data. After controlling for the involvement with helping behavior (WTS: F(1, 71) = 7.758, p < .01; eWOM: F(1, 71) = 22.039, p < .001), the results

revealed a significant main effect on WTS ($F(2, 71) = 4.394$, $p < .05$) and eWOM ($F(2, 71) = 9.34$, $p < .001$). A series of pairwise comparisons were subsequently performed to clarify the relationship between these three groups (injunctive norms, descriptive norms, and control condition). As shown in Figure 3 (next page), participants in the injunctive norms condition showed significantly higher WTS ($M = 5.5$, $SD = 1.11$) and eWOM ($M = 5.86$, $SD = 1.23$) than those in the control condition (WTS: $M = 4.5$, $SD = 1.22$, $F(1, 48) = 4.66$, $p < .05$; eWOM: $M = 4.46$, $SD = 1.23$, $F(1, 48) = 10.61$, $p < .01$), while participant in the descriptive norms condition reported lower WTS ($M = 3.81$, $SD = 1.86$) and eWOM ($M = 3.49$, $SD = 1.94$) than those in the control group (WTS: $F(1, 58) = 2.82$, $p = .09$; eWOM: $F(1, 58) = 5.83$, $p < .05$) at a marginally significant and significant level, respectively. Obviously, there were also significant differences between participants in the injunctive norms condition and the descriptive norms condition in terms of WTS ($F(1, 35) = 5.62$, $p < .05$) and eWOM ($F(1, 35) = 2.75$, $p < .01$). Thus, H1a and H2a were supported.



Figure 3. Differences between Injunctive Norms, Descriptive Norms, and Control Group on Willingness to Support (WTS) and Electronic Word-Of-Mouth (eWOM) for the Subsequent Campaign (Note: Involvement with helping behavior was included in the model as a covariate)

DISCUSSION IN BRIEF

The results of Study 1 supported the basic prediction that the type of social norms determines consistency and licensing effects. After controlling for the involvement of helping behavior, consumers persistently helped others in a later stage (i.e., consistency effect) when their initial prosocial behavior was performed under the consideration of what ought to be done (injunctive norms). However, in the case that consumers' initial prosocial behavior was triggered by the information about how many people have done (descriptive norms), they refused to help others in response to a subsequent campaign (i.e., licensing).

Study 1 found the boundary condition of the superiority of descriptive norms over injunctive norms. Descriptive norms were found to be less effective in encouraging consumers to behave ethically in a later campaign than injunctive norms despite their greater effectiveness in an initial campaign. This advanced the prior studies such that the superiority of descriptive norms over injunctive norms may be limited to an isolated and single charitable giving campaign. In a longer time frame, injunctive norms may have greater impacts on consumers' prosocial behavior than descriptive norms.

Despite its meaningful findings, there were limitations in Study 1. More than half of the participants who were not interested in donating money to the initial campaign were eliminated. Our focus on those who had prior experience of helping behavior was advantageous in elucidating which type of social norms led to consistency or licensing effect in the subsequent campaign. However, the exclusion of part of the sample in the first session resulted in the imbalance of sample size between three conditions (14 for

injunctive norms, 24 for descriptive norms, and 37 for control conditions). The imbalance and relatively small sample size likely contributed to some of the marginally significant outcomes in Study 1. A different experimental design was employed in Study 2 to address this shortcoming.

Study 2

The primary goal of Study 2 was to explore underlying psychological processes that account for the consistency and licensing effects. As described earlier, this research posited that injunctive and descriptive norms would tap into different aspects of moral identity (moral internalization and moral symbolization, respectively), and subsequently lead to an increase or a decline in their prosocial behavior for the following request (H1b and H2b). To test these predictions, Aquino and Reed's (2002) Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale was implemented and the mediation analysis was conducted. Study 2 also attempted to enhance the generalizability of the current research in two ways: 1) employing a different charitable giving context and 2) capturing participants' actual behavior instead of measuring their willingness to support the campaign.

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE

A total of 120 participants (M_{age} = 42.85 years, 73 Female) were recruited from Amazon's MTurk and were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (injunctive norms, descriptive norms, or control condition). The procedure and measures were in keeping with those used in Study 1 with the following exceptions.

First, as a new cause, “Helping people with disabilities” was employed (See Appendix E). A pretest (N = 57, M_{age} = 36.28 years, 29 Female, recruited from MTurk) confirmed that the Facebook page of “Helping people with disabilities” was not significantly different from that of “Helping underprivileged children” in terms of believability ($M_{children}$ = 5.45 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.89; $p > .1$), interest ($M_{children}$ = 5.31 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.54; $p > .1$), trustworthiness ($M_{children}$ = 5.1 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.54; $p > .1$), quality ($M_{children}$ = 5.14 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.36; $p > .1$), and the importance of the cause ($M_{children}$ = 5.89 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.91; $p > .1$). In Study 1, the cause of homeless people was not significantly different on these measures from the cause of underprivileged children. Thus, it was assumed that the three causes used in this research seemed appropriate and was not uniquely influencing the results. Consistent with Study 1, the order of the presentation of the two campaigns was counterbalanced, and the manipulation of social norms was implemented only into the initial campaign.

Second, rather than indicating whether participants would be willing to donate their money to the ‘initial’ campaign (i.e., Yes or No), participants in injunctive and descriptive norms conditions (not participants in the control condition) were asked to indicate how much money they are willing to donate on a scale ranging from $0 to $10. To prevent the ceiling and floor effects, $5 was indicated as a reference point of the scale in which participants can determine they would donate more or less. This measurement of a continuous variable prevented a large part of data from being eliminated after the first session.

Third, after reporting the extent to which they were willing to donate for the initial campaign, all participants completed Aquino and Reed's (2002) Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale. This measure consisted of a 10-item scale reflecting two conceptually distinctive dimensions of moral identity (moral internalization and moral symbolization) and was known to be internally consistent, had significant test-retest reliability, and had strong predictive validity for various types of moral cognition and behavior (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007; Winterich et al., 2009). Even if this scale has largely been used for measuring an individual's moral identity traits, prior research demonstrated that priming techniques can make a certain self-concept dominant over another temporally, and the dominant self-concept subsequently influences the individual's cognition and behaviors (e.g., Winterich et al., 2013). In this light, different types of social norms were expected to make a particular dimension of moral identity more salient and therefore had an effect on participants' responses to subsequent requests.

Lastly, instead of measuring participants' willingness to support the subsequent campaign (WTS), participants were directly asked to indicate whether they would donate their participation compensation (50 cents) to the "WeSupport" (i.e., Yes or No). To enhance realism, participants were told that 50 cents will be automatically deducted from the reward for participating in the study (see Appendix D for the detailed descriptions). At the end of the study, participants indicated the extent to which they believed the donation was real and then were told that this question was set for experiment purposes and would not affect the compensation. To prevent the case that the possibly low rate of

actual giving may negatively impact the eWOM, the measure of eWOM preceded the measure of actual donation on a separate page.

RESULTS

The results of manipulation checks showed that believability ($M_{children}$ = 5.57 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.63; $p > .1$), interest ($M_{children}$ = 4.9 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.13; $p > .1$), trustworthiness ($M_{children}$ = 5.14 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.27; $p > .1$), writing quality ($M_{children}$ = 5.29 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.39; $p > .1$), and importance ($M_{children}$ = 5.14 vs. $M_{disabilities}$ = 5.27; $p > .1$) were not significantly different between the causes of helping people with disabilities and helping underprivileged children. The Facebook page of descriptive norms was perceived to illustrate what the majority of people have done (M = 5.76) rather than what ought to be done (M = 4.04, $p < .001$) whereas the Facebook page of injunctive norms was thought to indicate what ought to be done (M = 5.92) rather than what the majority of people have done (M = 3.73, $p < .001$). Thus, the use of two causes and social norms manipulations were suitable and effective. Furthermore, a principal component analysis (varimax rotation) was conducted and found that the 10-item scale measuring moral identity was categorized into two factors: five 'internalization' items (M = 5.52, SD = 1.36, α = .9) and five 'symbolization' items (M = 4.33, SD = 1.62, α = .91; explained variance = 75.85%).

Donation to the initial campaign

The results of an ANCOVA, using the involvement with helping behavior as a covariate ($p < .05$), revealed that there was a significant difference between injunctive and descriptive norms conditions in terms of participants' willingness to donate money to

the initial campaign ($F(1, 77) = 4.76$, $p < .05$). Specifically, participants in the descriptive norms ($M = 5.07$, $SD = 3.19$) indicated that they were more likely to donate money to the initial campaign than those in the injunctive norms condition ($M = 3.1$, $SD = 3.02$). This was aligned with prior research such that descriptive norms are more effective in encouraging consumers to engage in prosocial behavior than injunctive norms.

Electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) for the subsequent campaign

An ANCOVA was first performed to examine whether two types of social norms in the initial campaign had differential effects on participants' engagement in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) for the subsequent campaign, using the involvement with helping behavior as a covariate. Those who had indicated $0 contribution for the initial campaign (N = 24) were not included in the analysis, leaving 96 participants. Because these participants had received the donation question about the manipulated initial campaign, they were qualitatively different from those in the control group. Strictly speaking, they had experience of denying engaging in prosocial behavior, which is out of the scope of the current research.

After controlling for the involvement with helping behavior ($p < .001$), a significant main effect of three conditions on eWOM was found ($F(2, 92) = 30.14$, $p < .001$). The pairwise comparisons revealed that participants in the injunctive norms condition reported a marginally higher eWOM ($M = 5.48$, $SD = .96$) than those in the control condition ($M = 4.78$, $SD = 1.5$, $F(1, 60) = 3.66$, $p < .05$), while participant in the descriptive norms condition indicated a significantly lower eWOM ($M = 3.15$, $SD = 1.01$)

than those in the control group ($F(1, 67) = 25.7$, $p < .001$). The differences between the injunctive and the descriptive norms conditions were also significant ($p < .001$). Thus, H1a and H2a were supported again.

The mediating effects of moral internalization and moral symbolization on eWOM were tested, using Preacher and Hayes' (2008) PROCESS macro (Model 4). Only two types of social norms were included in the mediation analysis for the following two reasons. First, the dominance of a particular moral identity would be determined by whether participants were presented with injunctive norms or descriptive norms. Thus, the comparison between two types of social norms would more clearly demonstrate the mediating effects of two moral identities. Second, even if it appeared to be a critical confounding variable, the extent to which participants donate money to the initial campaign was not successfully controlled for in the previous analysis. As participants in the control group did not respond to the donation question about the initial campaign, and they were considered missing data when the control group was included in the model. To effectively demonstrate the mediating roles of two types of moral identities and minimize the confounding effect of the prior donation, thus, the two types of social norms were used as an independent variable (-1 = injunctive norms, 1 = descriptive norms). Two dimensions of moral identity, involvement with helping behavior and prior donation, were mean-centered and were entered in the model as mediators and covariates.

As shown in Figure 4 (next page), the results showed a significant indirect effect of social norms on eWOM through moral internalization (β = -.29, 95% CI -.52 to -.04). Specifically, injunctive norms (vs. descriptive norms) in the initial campaign yielded

significantly higher levels of moral internalization (β = -1.02, CI -1.33 to -.72), which then led to a significant increase in eWOM of the subsequent campaign (β = .28, 95%, CI .05 to .51), supporting H1b. A significant indirect effect of social norms on eWOM through moral symbolization (β = -.36, 95% CI -.67 to -.11) was also found. In detail, descriptive norms (vs. injunctive norms) in the initial campaign activated significantly higher levels of moral symbolization (β = 1.08, CI .78 to 1.37), which resulted in a significant decline in eWOM of the subsequent campaign (β = -.34, CI -.47 to -.11). Thus, H2b was supported.



Figure 4. Mediating Effects of Moral Internalization and Moral Symbolization on Electronic Word-Of-Mouth (eWOM) (Note: * means the regression coefficient is significant at least the $p < .05$ level. Involvement with helping behavior and prior donation were included in the model as covariates)

Actual donation to the subsequent campaign

Only 13% of participants (13 out of 96) indicated that they were willing to make an actual donation to the subsequent campaign. Due to the low rate of response, no significant differences were found among the three conditions: injunctive norms (19.2%, 5 out of 26), descriptive norms (12.1% 4 out of 33), and control group (10.8%, 4 out of 37). This issue will be further discussed in the next section. The results were not changed even after controlling for the believability of actual donation (M = 4.66, SD = 2.05).

DISCUSSION IN BRIEF

Study 2 provided cumulative evidence that the type of social norms presented in the initial campaign was a key construct that facilitates or hinders consumers' subsequent prosocial behavior. When the prior campaign highlighted injunctive norms, they were more willing to engage in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) compared to those in the control condition. On the contrary, when the initial campaign emphasized descriptive norms, they were less likely to engage in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM) compared to those in the control condition. A new cause ("Helping people with disabilities") was employed and the consistent findings with Study 1 were obtained in Study 2, suggesting that the conceptual design of the current research was robust and applicable to other prosocial issues.

Study 2 also demonstrated the mediating effect of moral identity. In comparison to the descriptive norms (injunctive norms), injunctive norms (descriptive norms) also reported higher (lower) eWOM for the subsequent campaign. Importantly, the consistency effect of injunctive norms was mediated by moral internalization, while the

licensing effect of descriptive norms was mediated by moral symbolization. This suggested that the consistency and licensing effects were derived from their motives to be consistent with the internal part of the moral self-concept and to project a favorable aspect of moral identity to others through actions in the world, respectively. Thus, Study 2 showed that different types of social norms made a particular dimension of moral identity more salient and therefore had an effect on participants' responses to subsequent requests.

Study 2 attempted to capture consumers' actual donation, but no significant differences among the three conditions (injunctive, descriptive, and control) were found. The statistically insignificant result was possibly due to the low rate of actual donation. A large body of research has already noted that consumers' favorable attitude toward the prosocial issue often fails to predict their actual helping behavior (Atkinson, 2013; Atkinson and Kim, 2015; Auger and Devinney, 2007; Carrigan et al., 2010; d'Astous and Legendre, 2009). Consumers are generally skeptical of how authentic the organization's concern is about the causes they promote (Forehand and Grier, 2003; Skarmeas and Leonidou, 2013; Webb and Mohr, 1998). In addition, actual donation involves multi-attribute decision making that considers several factors, such as whether their donation goes directly to recipients and whether their donation can have an actual effect. However, this study did not specify any information about nonprofit organizations that were soliciting donations in order to minimize potential confounding effects and rule out alternative explanations. Thus, the lack of detailed information appeared to contribute to the insignificant results. The moderate levels of the believability of actual donation (M =

4.66, *SD* = 2.05) supported this argument. Nevertheless, 13% of actual donation was believed to be meaningful considering that only 1.1% of website visitors donated in reality (The Non Profit Times, 2018). This issue will be further discussed in the limitation and future research section of the general discussion.

It was worth discussing the ways of hypothesis testing. Mullen and Monin (2016) noted that researchers cannot distinguish the contribution of licensing and compensation in the absence of a baseline. In this light, this paper tested the hypotheses by comparing differences occurred in the subsequent campaign between each social norm condition and the control condition. This analysis was idealistic when the initial helping behavior was measured with a discrete variable (whether they helped or not). However, the extent to which consumers engaged in an initial helping behavior appeared to be an important factor influencing their response to subsequent requests. Advancing the previous research, thus, Study 2 used the measurement of a continuous variable for the initial helping behavior on the scale ranging from donations of $0 to $10. This approach was expected not only to prevent part of data from being excluded in the data analysis process but also to allow researchers to account for the degrees of prior helping behavior. Nevertheless, this approach also entailed a problem. The statistics recognized the control condition as missing data due to the lack of their response to the initial helping behavior. The variance of the initial helping behavior was not accountable when the control condition entered the model.

Alternative ways of analyzing data were proposed as follows: 1) focusing on the difference of helping behavior between two types of social norms in the subsequent

campaign after controlling for the degree of initial helping behavior, as we did in the mediating tests, and 2) focusing on the difference in the change of participants' helping behaviors observed in the stream of initial and subsequent campaigns. Even if the first way appeared to be the simplest and most effective way to differentiate the consistency and licensing effects, controlling for the variance of participants' initial donation could diminish (or blur) the distinctive effects of two types of social norms on the subsequent campaign. In this regard, the second one was worth testing. If injunctive (descriptive) norms of the initial campaign lead to the consistency (licensing) effect, participants would exhibit increased (decreased) intentions to support the subsequent campaign compared to the initial campaign. In this case, people's initial helping behavior in each type of social norms is considered a true baseline and there will be significant differences between two types of social norms in the degree of response changes. In other words, keeping track of reactions to the initial and subsequent campaign could provide direct evidence about whether social norms are a factor bridging the gap between the consistency or licensing effects without the control condition. To gain a complete understanding of the role of social norms, the second way of analyzing data was implemented in the next study.

Study 3

The main goal of Study 3 was to test the hypothesis that providing a moral message intensifying the internal aspect of moral identity can mitigate the licensing effect of descriptive norms. The reasoning is that the moral message would redirect the focus of

participants in the descriptive norms condition to the superordinate meaning of the helping behavior (i.e., virtue ethic) and this, in turn, could lessen the licensing effect. Study 3 also aimed to provide more direct evidence for the consistency and licensing effects by taking into account the change of individual consumer's helping behaviors between initial and subsequent campaigns. The same measurements were used in both campaigns to tease out the influence of social norms. A different way of social norms manipulation was implemented in a different online platform (Pop-up messages in a charitable organization's website) to maximize the experimental realism.

PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE

Experimental design and sample

A 2 (Social norms of the initial campaign: Injunctive vs. Descriptive) × 2 (Moral message: Yes vs. No) between-subjects design was employed. A total of 160 participants (M_{age} = 40.44 years, 85 Female) were recruited from Amazon's MTurk and were randomly assigned to four conditions. The control condition was not included in Study 3.

Stimuli development

For the experiment, two main webpages of a fictitious charitable organization named "Support.org" were created for two causes used in Study 1: "Helping underprivileged children" and "Helping homeless people." As shown in Appendix F, the layout of these webpages was kept the same, but they contained different written and graphical content to describe these two different campaigns. In reality, a series of calls for help are often made by several requesters. To enhance the realism of the experiment, neutral names of two authors were used for the two campaigns ("Mary Rubin" for the

underprivileged children campaign and "Paul Smith" for the homeless people campaign). A pretest[1] (N = 55, M_{age} = 41.18 years, 33 female) confirmed that the two campaigns did not significantly differ in terms of believability ($M_{children}$ = 5.47 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.58; p > .1), interest ($M_{children}$ = 5.13 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.29; p > .1), trustworthiness ($M_{children}$ = 5.38 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.35; p > .1), or quality ($M_{children}$ = 5.18 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.15; p > .1). The importance of two causes were not found to be significant different ($M_{children}$ = 5.78 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.65; p > .1). For the name of the requesters, participants in the pretest also measured the extent to which the given names are common, ordinary, and usual on a seven-point semantic scale (e.g., 1 = Uncommon, 7 = Common). The results of the pretest revealed that two requesters' names were not significantly different in this regard (M_{Mary} = 6.12 vs. M_{Paul} = 6.16; p > .1).

The moral message was manipulated in the form of a popup message, saying "…You are a person who truly cares about people in need" (See Appendix H). The effectiveness of this moral message was demonstrated as part of the pretest stated above. As a different session of the study, participants in the pretest were first asked to recall "a time when you did something ethical in a work or professional setting (Jordan et al., 2011)." After reporting their ethical behavior, only half of the participants were presented with the moral message whereas the rest of them did not receive this message. All participants then proceeded to complete the moral identity scale (Aquino and Reed, 2002). It was predicted that reading the moral message would lead participants to have a

[1] Even if the two causes were confirmed in Study 1, another pretest was conducted in Study 3 to resolve a concern that the use of a different online platform and the different requesters may have confounding effects.

stronger tendency toward placing the internal aspects of moral identity in the center of self-concept than those who did not read such a message. The results showed that participants who had the moral message (M = 6.11, SD = .70) reported higher levels of moral internalization scores than those who did not receive the moral message (M = 5.57, SD = 1.15; $t(53) = -2.105$, $p < .05$), meaning that the exposure to the moral message can effectively increase the moral internalization among people[2]. The results also revealed that there was no significant difference in the moral symbolization scores regardless of whether participants read the moral message (M = 4.63, SD = 1.12) or not (M = 4.46, SD = 1.54; $p > .1$). This suggested that the manipulated moral message uniquely influenced participants' internal moral identity.

Procedure

In keeping with actual charitable campaigns online, participants followed several steps to indicate the likelihood of supporting the assigned cause. Specifically, participants were first asked to freely view the content of the initial campaign at their own pace. Different from Study 1, social norm messages were not embedded in the main page of the initial campaign. Participants in both social norms condition read the same content. However, when five seconds have elapsed, a popup message suddenly appeared in the center of the webpage saying, "…It is our responsibility to help underprivileged children

[2] Note that not only the internalization mean of the moral message condition was significantly higher than that of the no moral message condition, but also, at the absolute level, an average score of internalization was very high. This was not a unique case of the current research. Prior research also noted that internalization scores tend to be high (e.g., Winterich et al., 2013). Thus, reference to low internalization in the no moral message condition is not indicative of an absence of internalization; rather, it is lower in a relative sense such that moral identity may still be important to a person's self-concept.

(homeless people)" – injunctive norms – or "…75% of people who visited this page supported this campaign" – descriptive norms (See Appendix G). After reading the popped-up social norm message, participants were led to the main page and asked to carefully view the rest of the main page again.

After viewing the main page at a self-paced rate, participants answered questions concerning their willingness to support the initial campaign (WTS; $M = 4.56$, $SD = 1.7$, $\alpha = .94$) and the willingness to engage in electronic word-of-mouth on online social sites (eWOM; $M = 3.89$, $SD = 2.15$, $\alpha = .92$). Participants then completed the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Internalization: $M = 5.55$, $SD = 1.39$, $\alpha = .91$; Symbolization: $M = 4.32$, $SD = 1.45$, $\alpha = .92$; explained variance = 74.8%). Upon completion of the filler task, participants viewed another campaign. Given that the order of the two campaigns was counterbalanced and the manipulation of the type of social norms was accomplished in the form of pop-up messages, the same stimuli could be used in both initial and subsequent campaigns without any adjustment. Considering that "Mary Rubin" was used for the underprivileged children campaign and "Paul Smith" was used for the homeless people campaign, participants were exposed to two authors, and the counterbalance of the order of two campaigns was believed to control for the gender effect.

After two seconds participants started exploring the webpage for the second campaign, participants in the moral message condition read a popup message, saying "…You are a person who truly cares about people in need" (see Appendix H), whereas participants in the no moral message condition did not read this message and viewed the

webpage without any interruption. After reading the pop-up message, participants in the moral message condition were redirected to the webpage of the second campaign and finished reading the rest of the content. Exploration of the website was self-paced.

After viewing the second campaign, all participants responded to measures for the two main dependent variables, which were the same as in the first campaign (i.e., WTS: M = 4.42, SD = 1.68 and eWOM: M = 3.84, SD = 1.93). They then answered to default questions regarding the website (i.e., believability, interest, trustworthiness, quality), the causes (i.e., the importance of the issues), the involvement with helping behavior (M = 5.32, SD = 1.04, α = .91), and social norms manipulation. Participants in the moral message condition also responded to a question of whether they remember the moral message being presented or not. Six participants who failed to recall the moral message was excluded from the data, leaving 154 participants in total. At the end of the study, participants completed demographic measures and were thanked.

RESULTS

The results revealed that two causes (i.e., Helping underprivileged children and helping homeless people) were not significantly different in terms of believability ($M_{children}$ = 5.67 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.49; p > .1), interest ($M_{children}$ = 5.17 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.21; p > .1), trustworthiness ($M_{children}$ = 5.2 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.32; p > .1), and writing quality ($M_{children}$ = 5.38 vs. $M_{homeless}$ = 5.31; p > .1). Participants also did not perceive the cause for underprivileged children (M = 5.65) to be socially more important than the cause for homeless people (M = 5.41; p > .05). Thus, the selection and manipulation of two campaigns' webpages were effective and successful.

A MANCOVA was conducted to test whether social norms had differential effects on the change of WTS and eWOM between the initial and subsequent campaigns, and how moral message moderates these effects. The type of social norms and the presence of moral message were included in the model as independent variables. To capture the linear change of helping behaviors between two campaigns, two dependent variables were created by subtracting participants' initial WTS and eWOM from that of the subsequent campaign (WTS: M = -.14, SD = 2.1; eWOM: M = -.06, SD = 2.26). The higher the scores were, the more participants wanted to support and recommend the subsequent campaign to others in social media. Involvement with helping behavior was included in the model as a covariate.

The results revealed significant two-way interactions of social norms and moral message on the change of both participants' willingness to support the campaigns (WTS; $F(1, 149) = 11.08$, $p < .01$) and electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM; $F(1, 149) = 8.83$, $p < .01$). A series of pairwise comparisons were conducted to better understand the nature of interactions. As shown in Figure 5 (next page), when the moral message was not presented, participants in the injunctive norms condition reported significantly higher WTS (M = 1.13, SD = 1.79) and eWOM (M = 1.1, SD = 1.66) than those in the descriptive norms condition (WTS: M = -1.66, SD = 1.58; $F(1, 77) = 51.92$, $p < .001$; eWOM: M = -1.94, SD = 2.56; $F(1, 77) = 36.67$, $p < .001$). Thus, H3a was supported, and this provided cumulative evidence that the type of social norms is the determinant of consistency (H1a) and licensing effect (H2a). Interestingly, different patterns of results were reported when the moral message was available. As expected, the WTS was not

different between the injunctive (M = .31, SD = 2.22) and descriptive norms conditions (M = -.46, SD = 1.71; p > .1), supporting H3b. However, a significant difference of eWOM between conditions of injunctive (M = .71, SD = 1.73) and descriptive norms (M = -.21, SD = 1.68; F(1, 71) = 5.02, p < .05) was found.

The significant difference of eWOM between types of social norms did not necessarily mean that the licensing effect of descriptive norms was 'not' mitigated when the moral message is provided. It was speculated that eWOM in the injunctive norms remained high as they were not affected by the presence of the moral message, resulting in the difference. To capture differential effects of moral message, follow-up analyses were performed by comparing the changes of WTS and eWOM between conditions of moral message within each type of social norms (H4a and H4b). As expected, there were significant differences in terms of the change of eWOM depending on whether participants in the descriptive norms read the moral message (M = -.21, SD = 1.68) or not (M = -1.94, SD = 2.56; F(1, 72) = 10.76, p < .01), so did WTS (Moral message: M = -.46, SD = 1.71; No moral message: M = -1.66, SD = 1.58; F(1, 72) = 11.58, p = .001), supporting H4a. The scores of WTS and eWOM for participants in the injunctive norms condition were not significantly different regardless of whether the moral message was presented (WTS: M = .31, SD = 2.22; eWOM: M = .71, SD = 1,73) or not (WTS: M = 1.13, SD = 1.79; F(1, 76) = 2.25, p = .14; eWOM: M = 1.1, SD = 1.66; F(1, 76) = .25, p > .1), supporting H4b. The results collectively indicated that the licensing effect of descriptive norms would be lessened when participants had a chance to incorporate the meaning of their past behavior into their self before making another moral decision.



Figure 5. A Two-Way Interaction between Social Norms and Moral Message on the Change of Willingness to Support (WTS) and Electronic Word-of-Mouth (eWOM) (Note: The change of WTS (eWOM) was calculated by subtracting the WTS (eWOM) of the initial campaign from the WTS (eWOM) of the subsequent campaign. Higher scores indicate the increased WTS (eWOM) for the subsequent campaign. Involvement with helping behavior was included in the model as a covariate)

This research posited that moral message bolstering internal aspects of moral identity would moderate the mediating effect of moral symbolization on the licensing effect of descriptive norms (H5a). The mediating role of moral internalization would not be affected by the presence of moral message (H5b). These predictions were tested using Preacher and Hayes' (2008) PROCESS macro (Model 14). Two types of social norms (-1 = injunctive norms, 1 = descriptive norms) were included in the model as an independent variable. The two dimensions of moral identity, moral internalization and moral symbolization, were mean-centered and included in the model as mediators. The mean-centered involvement with helping behavior was added in the model as a covariate. The moral message (No = -1, Yes = 1) was additionally included as a mediated moderator. The degrees of change in WTS and eWOM between the initial and subsequent campaign were used as dependent variables. See Figure 1 for the conceptual relationship between the variables.

Concerning the moral symbolization, significant moderated mediation effects for both dependent variables (WTS: β = .19, 95% CI .03 to .42; eWOM: β = .2, 95% CI .04 to .44) were found. Specifically, the mediating effect of moral symbolization was significant for WTS (β = -.24, 95% CI -.46 to -.07) and eWOM (β = -.17, 95% CI -.35 to -.04) when participants did not read the moral message. However, the presence of moral message resulted in the insignificant mediating effect of moral symbolization for WTS (β = -.04, 95% CI -.16 to .05) and eWOM (β = .03, 95% CI -.07 to .15). Thus, H5a was supported. The results suggested that descriptive norms (vs. injunctive norms) of the initial campaign decreased participants' support for a subsequent campaign (WTS and

eWOM) through enhanced levels of moral symbolization. However, a moral message functioned to prevent decreases in WTS and eWOM even if moral symbolization was heightened when using descriptive norms (vs. injunctive norms) in the initial campaign.

Regarding the moral internalization, the results showed that the moderated mediation for WTS was not reach to the significant level (β = .13, 95% CI -.1 to .36). The moderated mediation was also not significant for eWOM (β = .02, 95% CI -.22 to .24). These suggested that the moral message did not affect the mediating effect of moral internalization for both dependent variables. Thus, H5b was also supported.

DISCUSSION IN BRIEF

Study 3 expanded the scope of consistency and licensing effects by examining the role of a moral message as a moderator of the mediating effects of two moral identities. Specifically, the conditions under which the licensing effect of descriptive norms is mitigated was proposed. When consumers in the descriptive norms condition additionally received a moral message intensifying internal aspects of moral identity (e.g., "someone who cares about people in need"), their tendency to less support for the subsequent campaign became diminished. In addition to the mediating role of moral internalization, the moderating role of moral message provided indirect evidence that allowing consumers to have a sense of a good person is a key for their continuing prosocial behaviors for the future charitable social media campaigns.

Study 3 took into account the degree of consumers' intention to support for the initial campaign in predicting the likelihood of supporting the following campaign by using the same measurements in both initial and subsequent campaigns. From the

methodological point of view, this way of analysis was believed to more accurately capture the influence of an initial helping behavior on consumers' subsequent helping behaviors than other ways previous research employed (e.g., using a discrete variable or controlling for the variance of the initial behavior). Moreover, the use of popup messages in a website of a fictitious charity suggested that the findings of the current research could be generalized to different online platforms, organizations, and causes.

It was worth discussing the findings that participants in the injunctive norms condition exhibited decreased tendencies of WTS and eWOM with the presence of moral message (vs. no moral message). Although it did not reach to the significant level, the directions of the findings were opposite to the intuition that the consistency effect of injunctive norms might be stronger when a moral message is provided. The speculations were such that using a single normative information was enough to 'activate' the sense of what we ought to do. The repeated presence of similar 'ought to do' messages may disrupt their intrinsic and autonomous motivation to help others. Consumers may feel that they were being forced to be a good person and therefore expressed the decreased tendencies of helping others in the subsequent stage.

Please see Table 2 (next page) for the summary of the findings.

Table 2. The Summary of Hypotheses Testing

Studies	Study 1		Study 2		Study 3	
Dependent variables	WTS	eWOM	eWOM	Actual Donation	WTS	eWOM
H1a: When injunctive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable campaign, participants are more likely to support the subsequent charitable campaign.	Supp. □●	Supp. □●	Supp. □●	Not Supp.		
H1b: The consistency effect of injunctive norms will be mediated by moral internalization.			Supp.●	Not Supp.		
H2a: When descriptive norms are highlighted in the initial charitable campaign, participants are less likely to support the subsequent charitable campaign.	Supp. □●	Supp. □●	Supp. □●	Not Supp.		
H2b: The licensing effect of descriptive norms will be mediated by moral symbolization.			Supp.●	Not Supp.		
H3a: When moral message is not available, participants in the injunctive norms condition are more likely to support the subsequent campaign than those in the descriptive norms condition.					Supp. ●	Supp. ●
H3b: When moral message is available, the likelihood of supporting the subsequent campaign will be not different between two social norms conditions.					Supp. ●	Not Supp. ●
H4a: Participants in the descriptive norms condition are more likely to support the subsequent campaign when the moral message is available (vs. not available).					Supp. ◇	Supp. ◇
H4b: Participants in the injunctive norms condition will not be influenced by the presence of moral message.					Supp. ◇	Supp. ◇
H5a: When moral message is available, moral symbolization will not mediate the licensing effect of descriptive norms.					Supp. ●	Supp. ●
H5b: Moral internalization will mediate the consistency effect of injunctive norms regardless of the presence of moral message.					Supp. ●	Supp. ●
Note: □ means comparisons were made between a type of social norms and control group ● means comparisons were made between two types of social norms ◇ means comparisons were made between two moral message conditions						

CHAPTER 4. GENERAL DISCUSSION

Online charitable giving continued to show significant year-over-year growth based on its strategic effectiveness and cost efficiency. However, little was known about what drives consumers' sustainable and enduring helping behavior. Mixed findings that were largely categorized into consistency (i.e., consumers help more after engaging in a prosocial behavior) or licensing (i.e., consumers help less after engaging in a prosocial behavior) were reported in the literature, as a result. This research was embarked on to address this gap and reconcile the conflicting findings. Two approaches to ethics (normative ethics and behavioral ethics) served as theoretical underpinnings for the understanding of consistency and licensing effect. Consumers behaved prosocially not only because they are good people but also because there is a societal pressure to be good. These two motives co-existed in the same individual and distinctively influenced consumers' reactions to subsequent requests. In this light, the type of social norms was proposed as a factor determining whether consumers' initial prosocial behavior facilitates or hinders their subsequent prosocial behavior.

Across three studies, this paper empirically demonstrated that injunctive norms in the initial helping behavior led to increased meaningful support for a subsequent request. A message closely relating to the superordinate meaning of the behavior enabled consumers to keep moral identity at the center of the self. As a good person, their initial action served as a stepping stone to continuing support for their respective causes. The mediating effect of moral internalization supported this notion. On the contrary, descriptive norms activated a desire to be favorably viewed by others and made

consumers focus more on the action than its superordinate meaning. In this case, they became sensitive to what others were doing and were willing to behave in a consistent manner with them. The significant mediating effect of moral symbolization proved this argument. Descriptive norms appeared to be beneficial in generating greater support in response to a single and isolated request to give to a cause, but there was a backfire effect. This type of norm functioned to decrease in supporting subsequent requests because they achieved their goal by engaging in the initial request and did not have to present themselves in a positive light in later campaigns.

The present research employed diverse causes that are important in society (helping underprivileged children, helping homeless people, and helping people with disabilities) in two different online flatforms (Facebook and a website). Different ways of social norms manipulations were also implemented to enhance the realism. Consistent patterns of results suggested that the theoretical framework was robust, and the findings could be generalizable to other causes and online platforms.

Theoretical Implications

This paper made several theoretical contributions. First, most research on prosocial behavior has focused on maximizing the effectiveness of a single and isolated prosocial campaign. However, this only captured a snapshot of a larger sustainable cycle. In the context of charitable campaigns in social media, the current research provided a more comprehensive explanation of how people's prosocial decision making about a current

event can be affected by their past prosocial behavior or can influence future prosocial behavior.

Second, there has been an unanswered question about when and why prior moral behavior leads people to do more or less. In particular, evidence for both significant consistency and licensing effects in the same study was nearly nonexistent in the prior research (Mullen and Monin, 2016). This paper demonstrated that the type of social norm could be a key construct that successfully flips consistency into licensing in the same sequential behavior paradigm. The findings integrated seemingly contradictory empirical evidence from past research. Notably, the theoretical framework of the current research was rooted in two different approaches to ethics: normative and behavioral ethics. This provided in-depth knowledge about what drives and distinguish consistency and licensing effects.

Third, this study shed light on underlying mechanisms for the role of social norms on consistency and licensing effects by examining two dimensions of moral identity (moral internalization and moral symbolization). The accountability of these two moral identities was proved in both direct and indirect ways. In Study 2 and 3, moral internalization and moral symbolization were measured and shown to significantly mediated consistency and licensing effects of injunctive and descriptive norms, respectively. In Study 3, the presence of moral message successfully mitigated the licensing effect of descriptive norms on a subsequent request, providing indirect evidence that whether consumers put the morality at the center of their self through their initial prosocial behavior matters.

Fourth, this paper extended the breadth of the research on social norms and licensing by identifying several boundary conditions. The superiority of descriptive norms over injunctive norms has been documented (e.g., Angstrom et al., 2016; Cialdini, 1991; Goldstein et al., 2008). However, there is a scarcity of research examining whether this finding would hold when people make a series of ethical decisions. This paper found that the dominant effect of descriptive norms over injunctive norms did not persistent in a follow-up request and even ended up with a backfire effect. In addition, the present research took a step forward, suggesting that the licensing effect of descriptive norms could be prevented with the presence of a moral message that bolsters the internal aspect of helping behavior (i.e., moral internalization).

Practical Implications

This research had important practical implications for charitable and other nonprofit organizations. Despite the consistent year-over-year growth of online giving, two-third of charities still felt that they are missing out on opportunities for digital fundraising (The Non Profit Times, 2018). It might because most social marketing focused on maximizing the effectiveness of a single campaign, ignoring how it influences potential donors' reactions toward subsequent requests. In reality, donors give 42% more annually when setting up recurring donations, compared to one-time donations, and this accounted for 16% of online revenue in 2017 (The Non Profit Times, 2018). Given the importance of sustainable giving, appropriate marketing practice that bridges consumers' one-time giving and regular giving should be employed.

For initial support, descriptive norms may lead to greater support for the cause than injunctive norms. This type of norms makes people focus on the action of others and behave in a way that is aligned with them. However, when the influence on consumers' decision for future causes is considered, the findings of the present research indicated that the superiority of descriptive norms over injunctive norms may not always be the case. For the subsequent requests, descriptive norms elicited lower engagement from consumers than injunctive norms did. Their initial prosocial behavior ensured that their moral self was presented in a positive light to others, so they were not motivated to engage in subsequent causes. In this regard, this paper suggested that injunctive norms are more effectively drivers that encouraged consumers to engage in more sustainable and enduring helping behaviors than descriptive norms. The injunctive norms involved the perception of what one ought to do. Because this type of norm is closely related to the fundamental meaning of the behavior, it prompted consumers to be more likely to behave consistently for future causes.

Charitable organizations can use the knowledge of this research in their practice in numerous ways. For instance, social media content should draw attention to the internal value of the behavior it stands for, and how these values reflect consumers' moral internalization because it is certainly vital to keep moral behavior at the center of the self for the ongoing supporter. However, considering injunctive norms were found to be less effective in encouraging consumers to join an initial charitable campaign, emphasizing how those actions are favorably viewed by others could be a successful strategy for new donors. In this regard, the use of descriptive norms is also highly recommendable to

maximize the effectiveness of an initial campaign, but organizations should consider the boomerang effect of descriptive norms as mentioned early. The present research indicated that providing consumers with any type of messages (e.g., labeling, icons, etc.) that shift their attention to the connection between self and internal aspects of moral behavior (i.e., moral internalization) can prevent the boomerang effect of descriptive norms. This would allow consumers to continue to engage in subsequent meaningful support.

A report from The Non Profit Times (2017) suggested when, where, and to whom the findings of this paper could be applied. Holidays are the biggest time of year for those in the non-profit domain. In 2016, just under 25% of all donations received annually were made in the roughly five-week period between Thanksgiving and New Year. Charitable organizations' marketing activities should be intensively promoted during this time period, and the high frequency and shorten interval of requests would make potential donors to be more susceptible to the normative information of the campaigns. Concerning the media platform where donation campaigns should be run, websites are beneficial for those in the non-profit and charitable giving domain as they can easily manipulate content and user experience (UX) of the website. Social media is a critical factor in success. For instance, re-marketing on social networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn increased traffic to donation pages, and it resulted in 63% more online donations. 21% of donations were directly through social. Among diverse social networking sites, it appears Facebook is the most effective social media for causes. For instance, the largest Giving Tuesday payment processing platforms in 2017 was Facebook ($125 million). 18% of donors worldwide had given through Facebook

fundraising tools, and of those, 88% said they were likely to give through Facebook fundraising tools in the future. Lastly, concerning target consumers at which organizations aim their campaigns, social marketers should attract Millennials. This age group accounts for 25.9% of the US population and is active on their smartphones and respond best to text message and social media. They are interested in diverse social issues such as public and societal benefit, human service, education, health, and environment and animals. In 2017, 84% of Millennials gave to charity, donating an average of $481 across 3.3 organizations (The Non Profit Times, 2017). They were most likely to donate via online and watch online videos before making a gift.

In conclusion, non-profit and charitable organizations should continue to utilize marketing practice that connects people's helping behavior to the center of their self. The immediate effect of injunctive norms may not be apparent as it might not be wildly applauded by consumers at a glance. However, the initial action derived by injunctive norms will serve as a stepping-stone to continuing support for future causes.

Limitations and Future Research

There were several limitations to this research. First, it was still unclear whether the theoretical framework of this research was influential to consumers' actual helping behaviors. In Study 2, participants' actual donation was measured to address this issue, but the low rate of actual donation and the lack of sufficient information in the experimental design resulted in unmeaningful outcomes. Despite the significant findings regarding other variables (e.g., the willingness to support the campaign and electronic

word-of-mouth), there still was a concern that consumers' prosocial decisions could be exaggerated in a controlled lab setting (Levitt and List, 2007). Thus, future research should examine whether findings of the current research were flawed by the attitude-behavior gap. A field study not only would provide opportunity to look at other important dependent variables such as volunteering for the cause, but also would ensure external validity of the present research.

Second, even if the focus of this research was on consumers' sustainable cycle of prosocial behaviors, the investigation of the social norm effect of the initial campaign was limited to a single follow-up request. It was because this research placed more weight on theorizations of how an initial helping behavior impacts on a subsequent behavior than practical applications. In reality, however, consumers are usually asked to participate in three to seven campaigns after engaging in an initial prosocial behavior. It was still questionable how persistent the influence of social norms in the initial campaign would be. Social norms in the initial request may have an enduring effect on these following requests, or the secondary helping behavior could possibly serve as a new reference point that determines consumers' consistency and licensing tendencies for the rest of the requests.

Third, in addition to the number of causes, the time interval between requests is another area of interest. In this research context, participants worked on a filler task for about 3 minutes before engaging in a subsequent request. Cialdini et al. (1991) noted that social norms not only guide how individuals are expected to behave in a given situation but also remind them of what constitutes socially acceptable behavior over a long period

in the future. In this light, the following questions are raised. Will the influence of social norms be stronger or weaker after a brief delay vs. a long delay? What would be the prime-time interval between requests in which social norms would generate the strongest effect?

Fourth, the individual differences in moral identity could be more carefully dealt with. As mentioned early, the moral identity scale (Aquino and Reed, 2002) was originally developed to capture individuals' moral traits. However, this research assumed that the random assignment of participants to the conditions would cancel out confounding effects of participants' dispositional characteristics and not affect the results. In support of the prediction, the present research consistently found that leveraging social norms successfully activates a certain dimension of moral identity throughout a series of pretests and main experiments. Nevertheless, it was still not clear to what extent participants' moral traits contributed to the results. To resolve this concern, participants' moral identity might need to be pre-measured and controlled for. Alternatively, moral identity could be manipulated rather than being measured to minimize the confounding effect. Given that the consistency effect of injunctive norms and the licensing effect of descriptive norms were accounted by two different dimensions of moral identity, moral identity could have an interactive relationship with social norms. Specifically, the match between injunctive (descriptive) norms and moral internalization (moral symbolization) could activate a similar mode of mental representation, thus leading to stronger consistency (licensing) effects on the subsequent request. However, when social norms are mismatched with moral identity, they might not be effective in predicting the support

for the subsequent campaign. Investigating the interaction between social norms and moral identity could provide supportive evidence that two dimensions of moral identity are underlying mechanisms of the role of social norms on consistency and licensing effects.

Lastly, the current research confined to a moral message that emphasizes only internal aspects of moral behavior to examine whether connecting helping behavior with internal aspects of moral identity can alleviate the licensing effect of descriptive norms. The contribution of this research could be further extended if it added a condition in which the moral message was manipulated to emphasize external aspects of helping behavior as well. Do consumers in the injunctive norms condition become less likely to support the subsequent campaign if they receive a moral message that bolsters moral symbolization? As briefly discussed in Study 3, the impact of an additional moral message may involve qualitatively different psychological processes.

Based on two philosophical approaches to ethics (normative and behavioral), this research identified two motives for helping behaviors (as a good person and to be a good person) that account for the consistency and licensing effects. In a rigorous experimental setting, this paper provided empirical evidence when and why consumers do or do not continue to help others by exploring the roles of social norms and moral identity. Good contributions to the body of knowledge were made in this paper, but there much remained to be learned. This research, thus, will serve as a platform for understanding and further clarifying divergent findings in the prosocial literature, and setting an agenda for future research.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Facebook Fundraiser Page (Control Condition)

CAUSE #1: HELPING UNDERPRIVILEGED CHILDREN



CAUSE #2: HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE



Appendix B: Facebook Fundraiser Page (Two Types of Social Norms)

CAUSE #1: HELPING UNDERPRIVILEGED CHILDREN

Injunctive norms



Descriptive norms

CAUSE #2: HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE

Injunctive norms



Descriptive norms



Appendix C: Animal Crossword Puzzle as A Filler Task



1. Big animal that has one horn
2. This animal has a long trunk
3. This animal has a very long neck
4. This animal likes to eat carrots and sugar cubes
5. This animal loves bananas
6. Man's best friend
7. Some say this animal has nine lives
8. Lives in the cold and waddles
9. Slow moving and has a shell
10. Has big ears and likes to hop
11. King of the jungle
12. Striped animal that looks like a horse
13. Can swim under water and walk on land and has a big bite

Appendix D: Questionnaire Items

Content (A seven-point semantic differential scale)

1. Unbelievable – Believable
2. Unintersting – Interesting
3. Untrustworthy – Trustworthy
4. Poorly written – Well written

Importance of Causes (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Not at all, 7 = A great deal)

1. To what extent do you think "Helping underprivileged children" is an important issue in our society?
2. To what extent do you think underprivileged children are those in need?

Perception of Social Norms (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; Lapinski et al., 2013)

1. The information presented in the Facebook page indicated that most people who visited this campaign page helped underprivileged children (D).
2. From the information from the Facebook page, it seems that there are many people who helped underprivileged children (D).
3. The information presented in the Facebook page indicated that helping underprivileged children is what we ought to do (I).
4. From the information from the Facebook page, it seems that helping underprivileged children is approved behavior (I).

(Note: D = Descriptive norm item; I = Injunctive norm item)

Normative Belief (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; Lapinski et al., 2013)

1. I think that most people who visited this campaign page helped underprivileged children (D).
2. I think helping underprivileged children is our responsibility (I).

(Note: D = Descriptive norm item; I = Injunctive norm item)

Willingness to Support the Campaign (WTS) (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Extremely unlikely, 7 = Extremely likely; White & Peloza, 2009)

1. How likely are you to support this cause?
2. How inclined are you to support this cause?
3. How willing are you to support this cause?

Electronic Word-of-Mouth on Online Social Sites (eWOM) (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Extremely unlikely, 7 = Extremely likely; Eisingerich et al., 2015)

1. To what extent is it likely that you say positive things about this cause on social sites such as Facebook?

2. To what extent is it likely that you use social sites to encourage friends and relatives to participate in this cause?
3. To what extent is it likely that you recommend this cause on social sites such as Facebook?

Involvement with Helping Behavior (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Very infrequently, 7 = Very frequently)

1. How frequently do you typically help people in need?
2. How often do you give to charitable organizations?
3. How often do you volunteer for charitable organizations?

Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (A seven-point Likert-type scale; 1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; Aquino & Reed, 2002)

Instructions: Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe you.

Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind

For a moment, visualize yourself who has these characteristics. Imagine how you would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of how it would be like, please indicate your agreement with each statement below.

1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics (I)
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am (I)
3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics (S)
4. I would be ashamed to be a person who having these characteristics (I/R)
5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics (S)
6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics (S)
7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me (I/R)
8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations (S)
9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics (S)
10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics (I)

(Note: I = internalization item; S = symbolization item; R = reversed-coded)

Description of Consent Agreement on Actual Donation

If you press "Yes, I'll chip in 50 cents", you will enter the information into our database and certify that you have agreed to support this campaign. Once signed up, the reward of the current survey (50 cents) will be automatically deducted and go to the We Support. Supporting this campaign is completely voluntary. You may refuse to donate without any penalty. The details of the agreement, as well as the payment processing, will be shown at the end of the survey.

(Note: Response options were (1) Yes, I'll chip in 50 cents and (2) No, thank you)

Appendix E: Facebook Fundraiser Page and Social Norms Manipulations

CAUSE #3: HELPING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES



Injunctive norms

Descriptive norms

Appendix F: Front Pages of Website

CAUSE #1: HELPING UNDERPRIVILEGED CHILDREN

Support.org

Log in

Helping underprivileged children

279 have signed. Let's get to 500!

First name

Last name

Email

Support this campaign

Skip for now

Paul Smith

Aid underprivileged children by helping to provide them with the resources that all children need. Whether labeled as disadvantaged, low-income or at-risk -- these children often lack basic life necessities and access to resources for dealing with youth- and family-related issues such as motor development, nutrition and literacy. Fortunately, you can help them thrive during youth and succeed as adults by looking for opportunities to help through direct service or by assisting with resource development.

CAUSE #2: HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE

Support.org

Log in

Helping homeless people

279 have signed. Let's get to 500!

First name

Last name

Email

Support this campaign

Skip for now

Mary Rubin

By helping the homeless, we can see more than our share of the down-and-out. We find them in cities, in suburbs, under bridges, in parks, and on vacant industrial property. They live in tents, lean-tos, plywood and tarp contraptions that defy definition. Some of the homeless do work. Some have substance-abuse problems. Some suffer from forms of mental illness. Every one of them wants something the rest of us want as well: love and understanding.

Appendix G: Two Types of Social Norms

INJUNCTIVE NORMS



DESCRIPTIVE NORMS



Appendix H: Moral Message



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